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Abstract 
The United States Navy (USN) can rapidly respond to disasters due to high 
levels of readiness that are maintained on a constant basis The USN’s unique 
capabilities allow the Department of Defense (DoD) to engage in global 
humanitarian operations. We study optimization of the USN’s assets based on the 
existing work that analyzes USN disaster relief operations. In light of budget cuts, 
the realignment of forces, and the restructuring of the services, there is need for 
research identifying specific naval assets and their utility for conducting humanitarian 
operations. Our research is another step in that direction. 
Keywords: USN, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief 
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Optimizing Resources of United States Navy 
for Humanitarian Operations 
Introduction 
The goal of the organizations that provide humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief is to reduce suffering and fatalities. Estimating the quantity and type of 
demand is difficult, but what is even more difficult is assessing .where and when the 
relief is needed (Apte, 2009). However, providing relief depends on the speed of the 
response, and matching the supply with the need assessed (Apte, 2014). This is 
often a function of the capabilities and competencies of the organizations (Apte & 
Yoho, 2011a). 
The maritime strategy outlined in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower states that the USN will focus on partnerships with all the key players in 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) to safeguard United 
States’interests. The USN has made significant contributions toward HADR. Though 
this is possible due to the USN’s many unique and critical capabilities, in the past, 
not all of the USN’s efforts have been as efficient and effective as they could have 
been.  
There is plenty of evidence that proves the USN’s willingness to provide 
assets in disaster relief efforts. However, there has always been a need to perform 
HADR smartly and economically. It will be even more important in the future when 
budget reductions and uncertainty are likely to be the norm. Therefore, given the 
substantial costs incurred, the important question is whether the USN deploys or 
diverts the right ships for HADR. The experience off the coast of Bangladesh 
suggests that sometimes, it does not (Apte, Yoho, Greenfield, & Ingram, 2013). This 
research develops a mathematical model to optimize the deployment of USN assets 
during HADR operations (Apte et al., 2013). 
U.S. forces have been diverted from original missions 366 times for 
humanitarian assistance as opposed to 22 times for combat from 1979 to 2000, 
according to the fact sheets of United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and Center for Naval Analysis, as shown in Figure 1. If the ships sent are 
not capable of handling the humanitarian operations, the quick deployment of such 
ships does not serve the objective of delivering relief. For this purpose, it is 
necessary that we understand which vessels contribute what capability for HADR.  
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Figure 1. USN Ships Diverted for Humanitarian Operations 
The vessels that the USN deployed for HADR in the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami were the entire Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG), which 
included two fast attack submarines (SSN) and two Flight I DDGs. During the 
response efforts following Hurricane Katrina, the USN sent nine Minesweepers. In 
2007, in order to help Bangladesh with the Category 5 cyclone, Sidr, the ship that 
was diverted to help was the USS Hopper (DDG 70). Based on platform capabilities 
(Apte et al., 2013), some of these vessels did not play a substantial role in the relief 
process, yet they were tasked with these missions without accounting for their 
existing capabilities. 
Apte et al. (2013) investigated and identified the capabilities of USN vessels 
deployed to meet the HADR mission requests. The different platforms of the ship 
classes were studied and their HADR-related characteristics analyzed to find the 
relative utility of each vessel type using ordinally scaled expert ratings. The experts 
were USN surface warfare officers. We studied every ship that was deployed to 
respond to certain disasters.  Apte et al. (2013) studied the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake (National 
Geographic, 2005; National Geophysical Data Center [NGDC], 2011; VanRooyen & 
Leaning, 2005; Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2005; Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals [LDHH], 2006; National Oceanic Atmospheric 
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Administration [NOAA] Public Affairs, 2007; Plyer, 2013; Wooldridge, 2010). In 
addition, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan also prompted  significant 
support from the USN (Kaczur, Aurelio, & Joloya, 2012).  
 
Table 1. Response from USN  
(Greenfield & Ingram, 2011; Kaczur et al., 2012) 
Table 1 shows the response from the USN in the disasters, Indian Ocean 
tsunami of 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Haiti earthquake in 2010, and Japan 
earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Table 2 shows the categories of the ships sent. 
The ship platforms referred to in this research are those that have been deployed or 
diverted for HADR in the past. Their descriptions are given in Appendix A. 
 
Table 2. Categories of the Ships in USN Response  
(Greenfield & Ingram, 2011; Kaczur et al., 2012) 
We developed an optimization model based on the parameterized rating 
system (Apte et al., 2013) for selecting the optimal assets of the USN. Such 
methodology can provide an optimal mix of the ships that should be sent for HADR 
Disaster Number of vessels 
deployed
Number of days of 
assistance provided
2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami
29 81
2005 Hurricane Katrina 34 42















CG/DDG/FFG 6 0 4 11
LPD/LSD 3 3 5 15
LHA/LHD 2 2 3 6
CV/CVN 1 2 1 0
T-AH 1 1 1 0
MSC/Misc (w/o T-AH) 14 17 17 15
SSN 2 0 0 0
MCM/MHC 0 9 0 0
HSV 0 0 0 1
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based on available supply, demand, and capabilities through a portfolio of vessels in 
terms of best composition for the future force structure. 
The article is organized as follows: The next section describes the problem 
and the parameters used in addition to developing and defining the model. In the 
section following, we provide the results of this computational experiment followed 
by the discussion section. Finally, we offer our conclusions in the last section 
The Problem 
Before we propose the model of our current research, we first need to 
understand the demand due to disaster traits and relief requirements and, on the 
supply side, mission requirements and capabilities for those missions of the ships. 
Figure 2 describes the conceptual model on which we anchor our methodology 
(Apte et al., 2013). In the process of studying various disasters in our exploration of 
the topic of HADR, we have identified certain disaster traits that lead to specific relief 
requirements.  
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model  
(Apte et al., 2013) 
The capabilities of the ships to be deployed or diverted have been evaluated 
for a given relief requirement (Apte et al., 2013). Some capabilities are critical and 
some, though beneficial for the relief, are not critical. For example, one obvious relief 
requirement—the need for medical supplies, water, and food to be delivered—calls 
for a ship with the critical capability of lift capacity. Whereas, population dispersion 
requires search and rescue and personal transfer capabilities. Figure 3 depicts the 
interaction between Disaster Traits and Relief Requirements. This is not an 
exhaustive list by any means, but we want to show the underpinnings of the 
development of the optimization model.  
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Figure 3. Basic Disaster Traits and Relief Requirements  
(Apte et al., 2013) 
On the supply side, the ships diverted or deployed must have the ability to 
satisfy the relief requirement. A ship’s capability to conduct a certain HADR mission 
set is derived from the vessel’s characteristics. The USN has many  types of vessels 
with different capabilities. When a request for mission is received, a mission request 
process is generated by the officers of the Navy. There are different types of 
missions that operational commanders may be requested to conduct based on the 
capabilities of the ship. For example, aircraft support and freshwater production are 
some of the capabilities a ship may need to have to fulfill the mission request. Table 
3 describes the critical and non-critical capabilities. 
Large number of deaths and injuries
Population dispersion, homelessness, and large 
number of missing persons
Increased demand for critical commodities 
such as fresh water, food, and medical supplies
Need for medical personnel, facilities, and 
volunteers
Destruction of critical facilities and 
transportation infrastructure
Large amounts of debris and destroyed 
buildings
Search and rescue
Transfer of affected population
Triage facilities and operating rooms
Supply of fresh water or means to purify 
water
Stock of non-perishable food and 
medical supplies
Engineering equipment to construct 
temporary facilities and remove debris
Disaster Traits Relief  Requirements
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Table 3. Critical and Non-Critical Mission Capabilities  
(Greenfield & Ingram, 2011) 
The Environment 
Our problem posits a potential disaster in a littoral environment. The problem 
for the discussed scenario uses previous disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami, 2005 Hurricane Katrina, 2010 Haiti earthquake, and 2011 Japan 
earthquake and tsunami with the corresponding responses provided by the USN. 
Based on the extent of destruction and casualties, the affected host country (AHC) 
has requested HADR from the United States. While the State Department is 
ultimately responsible for the United States’ response to such requests they do not 
have the means to conduct HADR operations, but have the budget for HADR. Our 
notional costs are derived based on budget and the funding model of the State 
Department (Ures, 2011; Herbert, Wharton, & Prosser, 2012) and input from the 
subject matter experts. The USN is the leading organization in fulfilling the gap 
between who should and who can provide HADR. Given this history, in our scenario, 
the USN is getting ready to deploy and/or divert certain vessels to the affected 
country. Grounded in the previous experience and available analysis of the 
capabilities of the fleets (Apte et al., 2013), we developed the optimization model to 
decide what optimal mix of ships should be deployed to respond to this disaster.  
A Notional Scenario 
The AHC has suffered devastation due to high winds, torrential rains, and 
flood. There are many casualties and many more are injured, displaced, or missing. 





Roll On Roll Off (RORO)
Fuel storage & dispensation




Amphibious Landing Craft support















Critical Mission Capabilities Non-Critical Mission Capabilities
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telecommunication towers, are down. Certain roads are not traversable and bridges 
have collapsed. There is no potable water available. There is the fear of outbreak of 
diseases like cholera and malaria. The representative list of relief requirements 
consists of medical support and supplies, humanitarian supplies such as water or 
water purification facilities, search and rescue teams, temporary shelters, salvage 
operations, and engineering support for infrastructure. Based on these relief 
requirements, Table 4 describes a plausible set of demands for capabilities that are 
needed in the AHC.  
 
Table 4. Demands for the baseline model 
These are the demands on the notional scenario defined in the problem for 
the AHC. The demands are units of demand on a relative scale. The capabilities that 












10 5 3 7 2 2








4 2 1 4 2 2
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Table 5. Capabilities for relief requirements 
 
Table 6. Ship platforms and capabilities 
Table 6 describes the type of ships and their corresponding capabilities. A 
value of 2 means that the ship is capable, a value of 1 means the ship is somewhat 
capable, and a value of 0 means the ship is not capable for that type of demand.  
 
 
















Aircraft support 1 1
Landing Craft support 1 1 1 1 1
Search and Rescue 1
Dry goods 1 1 1
Refrigerated goods 1 1
Fresh water 1





Personnel support 1 1 1 1
Berthing capability 1 1
Medical support 1
Salvage Ops 1
Platforms                         
Capability
Nuclear 
Carriers Amphibious CRUDES LCS PM-1 PM-2 PM-3 PM-5 RRF
Landing 
Craft
Aircraft support 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Landing Craft support 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Search and Rescue 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dry goods 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 0
Refrigerated goods 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 0
Fresh water 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 0
Roll On Roll Off 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
Fuel 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0
Personnel transfer 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Freshwater Production 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Personnel support 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Berthing capability 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Medical support 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Salvage Ops 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
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Notation for the Model 
Index Sets 
I   set of resources (ships), for i I  
J  set of capabilities, for j J  
Inputs 
jD   demand for capability j J  
 ij IxJ   capability j J  of ship i I  
i jc   cost of functional capability j J  of ship i I  
2 if  is capable for 
1 if  is somewhat capable for 









1 if ship  is deployed or diverted
0 otherwisei
i
Y    







௜ܻ ൒ ܦ௝						∀݆ ∈ ܬ																																																										(2) 
௜ܻ 	integer						∀݅ ∈ ܫ																																																										(3) 
Objective function (1) minimizes the cost of a ship i across all the capabilities j J
summed over all ships i I , thus yielding the total cost. Constraints (2) ensure that 
demand for capability j J is met by the flotilla of the ships that are deployed and/or 
diverted to the AHC. Constraints (3) guarantee that fractional ships are not deployed 
or diverted. 
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The Results 
We solved the optimization model using Microsoft Excel Solver. Results of the 
baseline model using plausible yet notional data based on previously collected 
information for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, the 
2010 Haiti earthquake (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011; Ures, 2011), and the 2011 
Tohoku earthquake in Japan (Kaczur et al., 2012; Herbert et al., 2012) are given in 
Table 7. Since the accessible data only gave the functional cost for all the ships 
together, i jc the cost of functional capability j J  of ship i I had to be assumed to 
be the same across the ships.  
The baseline model offered one perspective—namely, which ships will be 
used if all costs were the same by focusing on capabilities alone as opposed to the 
cost of the capabilities. However, not all ships cost the same when deployed or 
diverted. The costs depend on many factors such as the ships’ size , whether they 
are built to commercial standards, and whether they travel with support or sail alone.  
 
Table 7. Results of the baseline model for deployment or diversion of 
ships to AHC 
In order to incorporate this limitation of the baseline model, we conducted 
sensitivity analysis by exploring the model further and focusing on the relative 
ranking of the cost of the ship itself with everything else being equal. The motivation 
was the same as before −to discover which ships show up in the optimal mix. 
Assuming that all ships are ready to be deployed and are travelling from same point 
A to same point B, and maintaining the same demands, we ran the model with 
Ship platforms Nnumber of ships Cost (in 
thousands)
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different rankings of the ship costs based on different subject matter experts. We 
gave higher rank to ships with higher cost. Thus the rank of the ship is the surrogate 
for its relative cost of deployment (and does not account for diverted ships). We 
understand that this is a limitation but it has its own advantage of evaluating ships 
based on deployment alone. We believe it adds to the set of data points for making 
an informed decision. The total cost is representative of the cost and not the actual 
cost. But it is descriptive of the cost incurred as the ranks are varied. The results of 
this computational experiment are given in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Results with Different Rank of Costs 
In order to explore how demands affect the optimal mix of the ships, in 
addition to the notional scenario, we also varied demands maintaining the same rank 
of cost to discover which ships show up in the optimal solution often. The demands 
were varied based on the past disaster characteristics and the affected area. The 
primary motivation for this sensitivity analysis was whether the demand or the costs 
dictate the mix of the supply. The impetus here was to see if costs or capabilities 
drove the model. Table 9 describes the results of the effect, if any, of varying the 
demand. The demands for the disasters were derived from extensive computation of 
the available data and discussions with subject matter experts. The demands for the 
computational experiments are given in Appendix B. 
Ship platforms Nuclear 
Carriers








3 2 4 9




3 2 4 9




3 2 4 9




3 2 4 9




3 2 4 9
Rank of cost 10 8 7 9 6 5 3 3 2 1 42
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Table 9. Results of the Model for the Past Disasters 
Discussion 
The developed optimization model was run for a notional scenario. The 
baseline results show that the optimal mix of vessels included amphibious ships, 
PM-2, and PM-3. The critical capabilities of these platforms together provide the 
necessary relief.  
The sensitivity analysis of the model by first changing the relative cost of the 
ships and then, by changing the demands based on past disasters while keeping the 
costs constant, yielded a set of optimal solutions. The solutions are summarized in 
Table 10. 
The pattern can be seen through the experiment. The ships that show up 
every time are amphibious ships, PM-2, and RRF. PM-1 and PM-3 show up a few 
times. But it is clear that the unique and critical capabilities of the amphibious ships 
in providing aircraft and landing craft support, search and rescue operations, 
berthing facilities, and transfer of personnel make them indispensable for HADR. 
That is most likely the reason why they show up in all the optimal solutions 
irrespective of relative cost or demand. Based on this result it is clear that 
capabilities of the ships for HADR is all that mattered in this experiment. The same 
can be said about PM-2 with its unique capability for salvage operations and RRF for 
its cargo space for dry and refrigerated goods, fresh water, and fuel. 
Ship platforms Nuclear 
Carriers





2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami
Nnumber of ships 0 12 0 0 0 10 0 0 15 0 196.6 37
2005 Hurricane 
Katrina
Nnumber of ships 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 19.4 4
2010 Haiti 
Earthquake
Nnumber of ships 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 74.4 13
2011 Japan 
Earthquake/Tsunami
Nnumber of ships 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 16.4 3
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Table 10. Results of Sensitivity Analysis, Ships in the Optimal Solutions 
What is also important to note is which ships did not show up even a single 
time in all these solutions. One has to keep in mind that we carried out the 
computational experiment for only the deployed ships. Of interest, the ships that 
never showed up were the nuclear carriers, crudes, and LCSs.  
It should also be noted that in investigating the binding constraint of all the 
versions of the model, we uncovered that demands for aircraft support, roll on and 
roll off capability, and salvage operations were exactly satisfied, indicating that these 
demands were critically satisfied with no surplus, whereas demand for fresh water, 
fuel, and berthing capacity were overly satisfied. However, when it comes to HADR, 
this is a good thing.  
Conclusion 
We conducted a computational experiment by developing an optimization 
model to find out which USN platforms are critical and hence most effective and 
efficient for HADR. Our conclusions were that amphibious, PM-2, and RRF ships are 
the most capable ships for humanitarian operations. On the other hand, nuclear 
carriers, crudes, and LCSs are not. We have to point out that there were certain 
assumptions made to look at the bigger picture. Availability of data or lack thereof 
was also a limiting factor. 
In the future research it would benefit the analysis further if the model is run 
with real, relevant, and appropriate data. We are currently exploring venues for this 
purpose. 
Sensitivity Analysis I
Fixed demand and vary relative cost
Ship platforms Nuclear 
Carriers
Amphibious CRUDES LCS PM-1 PM-2 PM-3 PM-5 RRF Landing 
Craft
Expriment 1.1 3 2 4
Expriment 1.2 3 2 4
Expriment 1.3 3 2 4
Expriment 1.4 3 2 4
Expriment 1.5 3 2 4
Sensitivity Analysis II
Fixed relative cost and vary demand based on disasters 
Ship platforms Nuclear 
Carriers
Amphibious CRUDES LCS PM-1 PM-2 PM-3 PM-5 RRF Landing 
Craft
2004 Indian Ocean 12 10 15
2005 Hurricane 1 1 2
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The current model can be enhanced in the future to eliminate certain 
limitations. It could be modified to include proximity of the ship to replenishing ports 
or AHC. The model can also be expanded to incorporate availability of the ships. 
It is also possible to use an entirely different optimization model such as a 
“set covering” model. Such a model would evaluate the minimum ships necessary to 
cover most relief requirements through their capabilities. 
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An aircraft carrier is a warship with a full-length 
flight deck and facilities for carrying, arming, 
deploying, and recovering aircraft, that serves as a 
seagoing airbase. A nuclear carrier is powered by 
nuclear power.
The Amphibious ships have the ability to move 
swiftly through water and over land. They operate 
year-round, handling power projection and beach 
assault, as well as assisting in crisis response, 
humanitarian operations and disaster relief.
Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates make 
certain no carrier, cargo/supply ship or oil tanker 
proceeds into an area where enemy action is 
possible. With lightning-quick communications, 
space-based radar systems, precision weapons 
and advanced engineering systems, these agile 
surface warfare ships provide anti-aircraft, anti-
submarine and anti-ship protective measures.
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Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) are the supply lines to 
USN ships at sea.  These ships provide virtually everything 
that navy ships need, including fuel, food, ordnance, spare 
parts, mail and other supplies.
Special Mission Program ships provide operating platforms 
and services for a wide variety of U.S. military and other 
U.S. Government missions.  Most special mission ships are 
Government-owned and operated by civilian mariners who 
work for private companies under contract to MSC. 
MSC’s prepositioning ships are able to discharge cargo 
pierside or while anchored offshore by using shallow-draft 
barges, called lighterage, that are carried aboard.  This 
allows cargo to be ferried to shore in areas where ports are 
to operate in both developed and undeveloped areas of the 
world.
MSC’s Sealift ships provides high-quality, efficient and cost-
effective ocean transportation for DOD and other federal 
agencies during peacetime and war.
The Department of Transportation's Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) maintains cargo ships in the 
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) to provide prompt sealift 
support in the event they are needed for the rapid 
deployment of military forces. The RRF includes RO/RO 
cargo ships, breakbulk ships, barge carriers, Auxiliary 
Crane Ships (ACSs), tankers, and two troop ships for surge 
sealift requirement which are capable of handling bulky, 
oversized military equipment. 
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ft Landing craft are used by amphibious forces to transport 
equipment and troops to the shore. Landing craft are also 
used to support civilian humanitarian/maritime operations. 
Landing craft are capable of transporting cargo, tracked 
and/or wheeled vehicles and troops from amphibious assault 
ships to beachheads or piers.
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2011 Japan Earthquake 
andTsunami
Aircraft support 17 3 9 1.0
Landing craft 
support
24 2 9 0.9
Search and rescue 6 0 0 0.0
Dry goods 12 2 7 0.7
Refrigerated goods 3 1 2 0.2
Fresh water 7 1 2 0.2
Roll On Roll Off 15 1 4 0.4
Fuel 15 1 4 0.4
Personnel transfer 3 1 2 0.2
Freshwater 
production
4 0 1 0.1
Personnel support 17 0 6 0.4
Berthing capability 3 1 2 0.2
Medical support 3 0 1 0.0
Salvage ops 10 1 3 0.4
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